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Abstract
With emerging of new cooperative applications, the
group communication is clearly become a very important
concept within the network architecture. The multicast
transmission is appeared as the most efficient way to send
some data to a specific group composed of several mem-
bers. Moreover, the increasing interest in network commu-
nication through the using of the Internet requires somes
services such as authentication, integrity and confidential-
ity to transport securely data. In this paper we present a
survey about secure multicasting. We describe the differ-
ent approaches existing to distribute and manage the keys
within a group. We point out how the IP multicast secu-
rity deals with. We show that presently no security model
meets fully the requirements needed for group communi-
cation.
1. Introduction
The rapid evolution technology towards high-speed
networks and processors have led to specific communica-
tion needs to meet the requirements of applications such
as audio and video conferencing, shared whiteboard... By
the way, the group communication is clearly become a
very important concept within the network architecture.
The multicast transmission appears as the most efficient
way to send some data to multiple receivers by reducing
the use of a lot of network bandwidth.
Moreover, the increasing interest in network commu-
nication through the using of the Internet requires some
services such as authentication, integrity and confidential-
ity to transport securely data.
A lot of research have been achieved to protect the
unicast communication and some standards are emerging
([1, 13, 15],...). But group communication makes more
complex the well-known security models. It involves
some specific issues which can have an influence on the
security architecture [7]: group size and scalability, multi-
cast application type(one-to-many or many-to-many), du-
ration of group life, heterogenity of group members,... .
The purpose of this paper is to present a survey about
network security within group communication and the
current related research works. The paper will be orga-
nized as follows. We shall first present the secure multi-
casting issues, more especially the scalability issues. In
order to provide security services, the entities must shared
some security parameters. Section 3 will describe the
management of these security parameters. Section 4 will
explain the different proposed approaches for the build-
ing and the distribution of the group key, the main compo-
nent of the group security parameters. Section 5 will point
out the main research works achieved within the Internet
world and presented at the IETF. Finally, we conclude in
Section 6.
2. Secure Multicasting Issues
Like all multicast protocols, multicast security proto-
col exhibit two types of scalability failures summarized
by MITTRA [16]: 1 affect n which occurs when a group
member affects all the other members and 1 does not
equal n which occurs when a protocol has to deal with
each member separately.
The joining of a new member exhibits only the first
failure type and the leaving of a member presents both
types. In order to ensure forward secrecy, when a new
member joins the group, the entity responsible for key
management, the key manager, must replace the group key
(the shared key among group members and used to enci-
pher the group communication) by another one. The key
manager multicasts the new group key to all group mem-
bers using one message encrypted with the old group key.
Consequently, the joining of only one member forces all
the other members to change the group key ; 1 member
affects the n(group size) other members.
To ensure backward secrecy, when a member leaves the
group, the key manager must replace the group key. To do
this, it needs  unicast messages to distribute the new key
to every member apart through secure unicast tunnels. So,
in this case, both types of scalability failure are exhibited.
The first one is 1 does not equal n when the key man-
ager sends the new key to each member as this last one
were independent of the group. The second one is 1 af-
fect n because the leaving of only one member involves
the modification of the key for the whole group.
Other scalability issues are induced by the lack of syn-
chronization between the group members during group
key update.  Receivers who cannot obtain the new key become un-
able to decrypt the group traffic. Moreover, they can
receive multicast communications from old mem-
bers.  Senders who cannot obtain the new key continue to
encrypt their messages with the old key. The mes-
sages will be understood only by the members having
leaved the group.
The synchronization problems can be solved by using
reliable multicast protocols.
Thus far, we have described the issues of the secure
multicasting, in the following section we will talk about
the group security management.
3 Group security management
A security protocol must allow authorized entities to
communicate securely over an insecure network where
intruder can read, eliminate or modify network data.
This is achieved by creating a security association[1],
SA(encryption algorithms and keys, authentication algo-
rithms and keys, SA life duration, ...) between the au-
thorized entities through authentication and key exchange
protocols. In unicast (multicast) communication, the set
of these parameters is called the unicast (group) security
association, SA (GSA) [1, 12].
Contrary to the SA which is managed by the two com-
municating entities, the security association of a group
cannot be controlled by all the participants. The man-
agement of the security association of a group means the
management of the group security, in particularly access
control to the group ( i.e. to multicast traffic of the group).
In the literature, we distinguish between two strategies
for multicast security management : centralized manage-
ment and decentralized management.  the centralized management is defined by the fact
that only one entity controls the group security [14,
19, 20]. And, all group members share the same key
used to encrypte multicast group traffic.  the second strategy consists of decentralizing the
group management [16, 11, 12] and dividing the mul-
ticast group into sub-groups. Each sub-group, man-
aged by a local controller, has its own key. The
sub-groups are linked by intermediate agents for con-
structing virtual group.
The comparison between these two strategies shows that
the second one presents a solution to the scalability fail-
ure 1 affect n. Members joining or leaving affect only the
sub-group to which the member belongs. Consequently,
this strategy fits better the dynamic groups. But, it is less
effective for diffusion of group data which undergoes en-
cryption/decryption operations by the intermediate agents.
On the other hand, the first strategy is more efficient for
data diffusion because it uses only one key shared between
group members. The problem of this strategy is the cen-
tralization of the group management : only one entity con-
trols the group. When this entity breaks down, the group
becomes out of control, even out of operation.
4 Group key distribution
In order to ensure confidentiality to group communica-
tions, the group members share a secret called group key
(or multicast key),
 
. A multicast message sent by a
group member and encrypted with
 
can be received
and decrypted by all the members who have the same key
(i.e.
 
). The entity responsible for this key is the man-
ager or the controller of the group, GC. This entity creates
and distributes the key, in a secure manner, to the different
members of the group.
4.1 The different approaches
The approaches used for the construction and the dis-
tribution of the group key fall, according to [2], into five
categories : approaches based on the information the-
ory, hybrid approaches, Diffie-Hellman key exchange ap-
proaches, SKDC (Single Key Distribution Center) and hi-
erarchical approaches.
The information-theoric approaches are based on the
information theory. BLUNDO AND ALL [4] propose a
scheme for distributing key for dynamic conferences. A
trusted server distributes private and individual pieces of
information to a set of users. Later, a determined size sub-
set of these users can calculate a secure shared key. Each
user calculates the shared key from the identities of other
users and his own piece of information.
The hyprid approaches scale linearly, or worth, in
group size. They reduce the storage space by finding
a compromise between different security strategies of
information-theoric. This is the case of [10] which allows
a central site to diffuse secure transmission to an arbitrary
set of users. Let us consider a center and a group of users.
The center provides each member in the group with a set
of keys. At a given time, the center transmits a message to
a privileged subset of users so that the other users cannot
decrypt this message. Each participant in the privileged
subset must be able to calculate the key to be used for de-
ciphering the message.
In the case of the approaches of Diffie-Hellman for
groups [18, 5], each group member i contributes to the
construction of the group key by a nonce 	
 . The group
key is  mod p ; where  is the product of 	
   .These approaches offer a distributed functional-
ity of calculation, but they suffer from a significant linear
number of costly public key operations.
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The approaches SKDC [14, 19] use a technique of
public-key exchange (e.g Diffie-Hellman key) for creat-
ing and distributing the group key to the other participants.
The number of exchanged messages due to eviction or ad-
dition of a member, and the computational operations car-
ried out by the group manager is of the order of n (n is the
group size).
Finally, we find in the last category the hierarchical ap-
proaches which scale logarithmically in group size. We
can distinguish between two types : the approaches re-
quiring trusted routers such as SMKD (Scalable Multicast
Key Distribution) [3] and the approaches which do not re-
quire trusted intermediate nodes. This is the case, for ex-
ample, of LKH (Logical Key Hierarchy) [19, 20] and OFT
(One-way function Tree) [2].
SMKD requires trusted routers and is based on CBT
(Core Based Tree) multicast protocol. The disadvantage
of this approach is that it depends on routing protocols
(here CBT multicast protocol); this comes up scalability
problems when it is used with other routing protocols. In
other words, SMKD is limited by intra-domain where the
CBT multicast protocol exists. LKH and OFT propose
a compromise between temporal cost, storage space and
exchanged message number [19, 20]. In order to facilitate
the distribution of the group key, they use a hierarchy of
auxiliary keys (intermediate logic nodes). The result is
that the storage space required for each member and the
number of transmissions needed to re-key the group are
logarithmic with the group size.
4.2 Comparative Analysis
Unfortunately, in order to ensure a long-term security
against coalition of evicted members, the information-
theory approaches need an exponential storage space.
Also, Diffie-Hellman solutions for groups are very expen-
sive. Generally, for the approaches based on information-
theory, public key cryptography (e.g D-H for groups),
hyprid and SKDC, the storage space, computation and ex-
changed message number increase linearly with the group
size (participant number) for addition and eviction of a
member. While these requirements increase logarithmi-
cally for the hierachical approaches.
In addition, the first three categories are theoretic [2]
and the security for some approaches of them is not yet
proven. As for SKDC and hierarchical approaches, they
are more practical. The rest of this subsection will be ded-
icated to analyze and to compare SKDC and the both hi-
erarchical methods LKH and OFT.
We can consider SKDC as the simplest approach.
However, since it does not solve the two scalability fail-
ures : 1 affect n and 1 does not equal n, SKDC fits es-
sentially small groups of discussion.
The result of comparison [2] of computational and
transmission requirements at the initialization of a group
shows that the size of broadcast messages for LKH and
OFT is the double of that for SKDC. This results from
the fact that each key of a binary tree of  leaves must
be diffused to all group members. Consequently, the ini-
tialization of SKDC is faster and less costly than the two
other methods.
Also, the comparaison of the manager transmission re-
quirements for SKDC, LKH, and OFT in the case of ad-
dition or eviction of a member [2] shows that, in the case
of SKDC, the manager transmission requirements is  
(where  is the group size and  is the size of crypto-
graphic key), while this one is     (  is the tree height)
for LKH and    for OFT. Therefore, OFT carries out
less transmission. Generally, LKH and OFT are more ef-
ficient than SKDC.
The comparaison of storage requirements [2] for the
three approaches shows that SKDC requires a storage
space less significant than LKH and OFT.
In summary, during group initialization, the approach
SKDC is more efficient than the hierarchical approaches.
Moreover, it requires a storage space less significant than
others. On the other hand, the hierarchical approaches
are more effective for dynamic groups ; because they
distribute the computational cost of re-keying among the
whole group. Finally, we note that OFT and LKH solve
the scalability failure 1 does not equal n by means of hi-
erarchy of keys.
In the following section, we will present works done
by the IETF to standardize IP multicast security based on
unicast security standards.
5 IP multicast security
Recently, many works [6, 7, 11, 14, 3] done by IETF,
have dealt with the multicast security on Internet. Among
these works CANETTI AND ALL [6] suggested an archi-
tecture of IP multicast security. This architecture tries to
reuse IPsec mechanisms as far as possible.
It separates the control plan of the data plan. The
first one contains modules responsible for the member-
ship management and the group access control. The sec-
ond one contains modules responsible for multicast data
distribution and the operations of authentication and en-
cryption. The module MIKE (Multicast Internet Key Ex-
change), inspired by IKE[13], is responsible for the man-
agement of keys and the multicast security association.
Most of the other propositions are concentrated on
multicast key management and can be incorporated into
the module MIKE. Also [11, 12] suggest that the multi-
cast group has to be divided into sub-groups distributed on
regions. Each region is defined from the protocols and the
entities available in the network infrastructure. The main
disadvantage of this solution is that it imposes supplemen-
tary processing on multicast data exchanged between re-
gions and consequently a reduction of the bandwidth on
the network. Moreover, it is based on protocols of unicast
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key distribution to distribute keys for group members.
BALLARDIE [3] also, proposes a solution to the scala-
bility problem of the multicast key distribution. This so-
lution is based on CBT (Core Based Tree) multicast pro-
tocol. Group key distribution forms a part of the process
of the junction of a system to the group tree. The back-
draw of this solution is that it is not independent from the
routing protocol and cannot react in the case of dynamic
group.
As for the approach GKMP [14], it is specified to work
in an environment of a multi-levels of security. It allows
an entity, group manager, to create and to distribute group
keys by cooperating with other members of the group. The
centralization of the group management is one of the de-
faults of this proposition. Also, the number of exchanged
messages at the moment of group initialization is signifi-
cant.
All these works are only attemps because the securization
of IP multicast is very complicated due to problems com-
ing from the scalability of IP multicast [17]: group size,
address allocation problems, limited storage space, flow
control, interaction between routing protocols intra/inter
domains, states to be memorized by routers, and signal-
ization between routers.
6. Conclusion
In this article, we have presented a general survey on
the state of the art of the group communication secu-
rity. We have noted that the problematic of the security
of this type of communication appears, for dynamic and
expanded group, in two forms of scalability problem : 1
affect n and 1 does not equal n.
We have focused our study on the approaches of the
multicast key establishement and the multicast security
management. Also, we have presented and compared
different approaches of multicast key establishment. We
have showed that the hierarchical approches resolve the
failure 1 does not equal n.
Also, we have presented approaches of group access
control. The works presented by [16, 11, 12] divide the
group into sub-groups and therefore resolve the failure 1
affect n, but they are less efficient than [14, 19, 20] for
the transmission of group communications.
Finally, we conclude that there is, presently, no satis-
fying solution for the multicast security. A such solution
should provide [8]: minimal time of group configuration,
traffic as reduced as possible, dynamic group, indepen-
dancy of routing protocols, confidentiality, integrity, and
authentication of data, decentralization of group manage-
ment.
Having these aims, we have specified a new group
key distribution protocol [9]. At present, we are using
NS (Network Simulator) to validate it.
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